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The “blue tsunami” midterm elections of 2026 are certain to have wide ranging implications for congressional behavior vis-à-vis the executive branch. Democrats have signaled, for example, their intention to conduct a variety of investigations and oversight hearings. As the incoming chair of the House Oversight committee put it: “LAWYER UP.”
One increasingly prominent tool of oversight is the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Under the CRA, expedited procedures facilitate congressional efforts to disapprove (i.e., eliminate) agency regulations and other executive actions. Here are three CRA questions to consider in the context of the 120th Congress, which convenes on January 3, 2027.
(1) Should we expect the introduction of a flurry of Democrat-sponsored resolutions of disapproval? YES.
(2) Should we expect a number of these resolutions to pass both chambers of Congress? YES.
(3) Should we expect any of these resolutions to become law? NO.
In essence, with Democratic congressional majorities and a Republican president, the CRA will primarily serve during the next two years as a position-taking device. Specifically, Democrats will introduce and take action on resolutions of disapproval knowing full well that President Trump will veto any that reach his desk. Furthermore, even if resolutions of disapproval attract Republican support (a plausible scenario given President Trump’s greatly shrunken coattails and lame duck status), it is unlikely that such support will be substantial enough to provide the votes to override vetoes.
Why will Democrats make such “futile” uses of the CRA? Resolutions of disapproval are (a) easy to introduce and (b) benefit from expedited procedures (including not being subject to the Senate filibuster). As a result, the CRA is an appealing avenue for making clear that the Democratic Party’s priorities in areas such as health, safety, and the environment are starkly different from those of the Trump administration and the Republican Party.
Given the Democratic Party’s institutional and mathematical realities (i.e., it doesn’t control the White House and doesn’t have the congressional numbers to override vetoes), the CRA is not well situated to serve as an instrument of eliminating agency regulations and other executive actions. It can, however, readily function as a tool for the taking of symbolic positions. In this way, the use of the CRA will mirror what we can expect in general from the next Congress.
The 120th Congress will not primarily be about the passage of legislation (although must-pass bills and occasional areas of bipartisan concern will certainly result in action). Rather, Congress will serve as one institutional setting (of many) in which the upcoming election of 2028 will be framed and contested. Expect the CRA—deployed by Democrats as a signal of partisan policy differences—to be one specific manifestation of this broader political contest.